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Abstract
Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the OECD and the EU rec-
ommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such mea-
sures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations.
Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels
of corruption and a relatively well-developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed
countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical
analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second par-
liamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption
agenda and the adoption of lobby registers.
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1. Introduction
Since the 2000s, more and more countries have adopted
lobby registers (Figure 1). These policy changes have
happened against the background of the OECD agree-
ment on principles for transparency and integrity
in lobbying (OECD, 2010) and the interinstitutional
agreement between the European Parliament and
the European Commission for a common and volun-
tary transparency register (European Parliament, 2019;
European Parliament & European Commission, 2014).
Prior to these international activities, very few countries
have used formal lobby registers (the US in 1946, the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1951, Australia in 1983,
and Canada in 1989; OECD, 2016).
Scholars have discussed the presence of lobby regis-
ters from different angles. On the one hand, researchers
have assessed lobby registers as a means of reduc-
ing the information asymmetry between legislators and
lobbyists and limiting undue interest group influence
(Ainsworth, 1993). Further, in this context, lobby reg-
isters are a means to level the playing field for polit-
ically active interest groups and to avoid a situation
where larger groups with more resources have an advan-
tage, as they can better exploit informal lobbying chan-
nels (Flavin, 2015). On the other hand, scholars have
discussed lobbying regulations in the context of trans-
parency. Researchers have argued that the adoption of
lobby register ensures that “citizens have the right to
know who is lobbying their government, its officials and
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Figure 1. Annual and cumulative frequencies of adoption of lobby register between 2000 and 2015. Note: Lobby registers
were adopted in Lithuania (2001), Poland (2005), Hungary (2006), Israel (2008), France (2009), Mexico (2010), Slovenia
(2010), Austria (2012), Italy (2012), the Netherlands (2012), Chile (2014), the UK (2014), and Ireland (2015); early adopters
not shown. Source: OECD (2016).
officeholders, and what they are lobbying them about”
(Murphy, 2017, p. 132). According to this body of liter-
ature, the ultimate goal of lobby registers is to reduce
and prevent corruption (Bauhr, Czibik, de Fine Licht, &
Fazekas, 2019; Bauhr &Grimes, 2014, 2017). As a preven-
tion tool, lobby registers allow citizens to monitor and
hold accountable elected politicians helping them iden-
tify misconduct in the interaction between lobbyists and
policymakers (Bunea, 2018; Cini, 2013; Pal, 2012, p. 175).
Although the use of lobby registers has been
widely recommended, this international standard
(Morais, 2001) has remained in its phase of emergence
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Researchers have assessed
factors that explain differences between various coun-
tries’ adoption of lobby registers. According to Crepaz
(2017), countries that signed the European Transparency
Initiative and have a strong second parliamentary cham-
ber have particularly adopted lobby registers. On the con-
trary, the index of perceived corruption has no impact
on the adoption of lobby registers. This result agrees to
some extent with the findings of other research, which
argues that the presence of systemic corruption success-
fully hinders the adoption of anti-corruption reforms
because if too many individuals profit from corrupt prac-
tices, corruption becomes a collective action problem
(Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). Another piece of
research indicates that in several long-lived democracies
statutory lobby registers have been adopted as part of
anti-corruption law, such as in France, or pushed through
the anti-corruption agenda triggered by political scan-
dals, as in Austria (Bolleyer, 2018).
In this article, we contribute to the literature in
demonstrating that low to moderate levels of corruption
have a positive effect on the adoption of lobby registers,
yet this influence is conditional on the size of the econ-
omy. We argue that governments have an incentive to
regulate lobbying if they consider that the economic and
social benefits from regulating corruption outweigh po-
tential costs. If there is a moderate level of corruption
and the economy is developing, policymakers tend to
adopt lobby registers as they consider abiding by inter-
national anti-corruption standards more important than
sustaining existing practices of corruption. On the con-
trary, very low or high levels of corruption will not result
in the adoption of lobbying regulations, either because
governments have no reason to act or because toomany
individuals benefit from corruptive practices.
We support this argument through a quantitative em-
pirical analysis and two case studies. Specifically, we con-
duct an event history analysis in a sample of 42 devel-
oped countries between 2000 and 2015. We control for
other explanatory factors, such as the size of interest
groups, bicameralism, age of democracy, foreign direct
investment, a spatial lag, and time. Further, we present
two case studies to discern how the framing of corrup-
tion as a political issue, embedded in anti-corruption leg-
islation, leads to the adoption of lobbying regulation. The
empirical findings attest that lobby registers are asso-
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ciated with corruption as well as with economic devel-
opment. Accordingly, this article contributes to this the-
matic issue on tools for tackling corruption in outlining
that the efforts to establish international standards on
corruption need to accommodate the differences in the
goals, capabilities or actions of individual countries that
limit their adherence to international standards.
2. Corruption, Transparency and the Adoption of
Lobby Registers as an International Standard
2.1. Lobby Registers, Transparency and Corruption
The use of registers regulates the access of lobby-
ists to public officials and decision venues and, conse-
quently, the extent of interest groups’ influence on pol-
icymaking (Bunea, 2018; Chari, Hogan, & Murphy, 2012;
Greenwood & Thomas, 1998; Holman & Luneburg, 2012;
OECD, 2009). Lobbyists are required to disclose the in-
tent, beneficiaries, and targets of their activities, and re-
port this key information in a public register (OECD, 2009,
p. 28). Therefore, registers inform both public officials
and the general public of the extent of lobbying activi-
ties (OECD, 2009, p. 28). Whereas public officials rely on
this information to understand the electoral salience of
a position represented by a lobbyist (Ainsworth, 1993),
the public can trace the interaction between lobbyists
and policymakers (Bunea, 2018). Thus, lobby registers
are an institutional tool that enhances citizens’ knowl-
edge of who is influencing policymakers. They allow
citizens to observe and scrutinize the interactions be-
tween policymakers and private interest groups at the
stage of policy formulation (Bunea, 2018). They attempt
“to redress the information asymmetry between orga-
nized interests and the public,” in order “to avoid the
risk of biased policy outputs, unequal interest represen-
tation/participation, regulatory capture and corruption”
(Bunea, 2018, p. 382).
Originally, lobby registers served the purpose of lev-
eling the playing field between and curbing the influ-
ence of large interest groups (Flavin, 2015; Zeller, 1948,
pp. 239–243). In addition, researchers have pointed out
that lobby registers increase transparency by reducing
the information asymmetry between citizens and poli-
cymakers (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014, 2017) and by shed-
ding light on the inherently secretive activity of lobby-
ing (Goldberg, 2018). The purpose of this type of trans-
parency is to hold public officials accountable (Bauhr &
Grimes, 2017; OECD, 2009). Being registered and disclos-
ing information determines whether the access of a lob-
byist to a policymaker is legitimate (OECD, 2009). The
immediate aim of transparency is to make information
accessible (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). The ultimate—
although indirect—goals of regulating lobbying are to
augment accountability, to prevent corruption (Bauhr
et al., 2019; Crepaz & Chari, 2018; Lindstedt & Naurin,
2010), and to enhance public trust in political institutions
(Chari et al., 2012, p. 5).
The link between lobbying and corruption is impor-
tant. Since money, relationships, and information are
the common ways to influence policymakers (Apollonio,
Cain, & Drutman, 2008), “the modes of influence of lob-
bying and corruption follow similar patterns and the logic
of exchange models with prerequires access and trust”
(Goldberg, 2018, p. 201). Accordingly, corruption and
lobbying tend to overlap (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007;
Grossman & Helpman, 2001). Campos and Giovannoni
(2007) argue that, in developed countries, lobbying and
corruption are interchangeable as lobbyists can influ-
ence lawmakers that the resulting rule is aligned to their
represented interest, thus making corruption of law en-
forcers redundant. Further, from a legal perspective it is a
complex matter to distinguish between unregulated lob-
bying and illegal trading in influence that occurs when
a person who has real or apparent influence on the
decision-making of a public official exchanges this influ-
ence for an undue advantage.
2.2. The Emergence of Lobby Registers as an
International Standard
The anti-corruption aspect on lobby registers has
emerged in the policy agenda of the EU (Bunea, 2018,
2019; Cini, 2008, 2013; European Commission, 2007;
Kanol, 2012; Milicevic, 2017) and the OECD (Alter, 2010).
The OECD recommendations for regulating lobbying, set-
ting ethical conduct, managing conflict of interest, and
regulating public procurement all share “a strong moral
stance against corruption, bribery, and inappropriate in-
fluence in the policy process, as well as support for ethics
and integrity in the public service” (Pal, 2012, p. 175).
Developed by the Directorate for Public Governance and
Territorial Development, the OECD lobbying principles
became one of the most influential instruments in set-
ting public governance standards (OECD, 2009, 2012;
Pal, 2012, pp. 175–176). In a similar vein, the EU trans-
parency register was part of the European Transparency
Initiative that entailed also anti-fraud and financial man-
agement, and ethical standards for EU officials (Cini,
2008, p. 750). Like the OECD, the European Commission
has promoted and coordinated the EUmember states’ ef-
forts to ensure transparency through an anti-corruption
agenda. In order to share experience on anti-corruption
policies, both international organizations (IOs) surveyed
theirmembers’ lobbying regulation by publishing reports
(OECD, 2009, 2012) and collecting data through national
anti-corruption reports (European Commission, 2016).
An empirical analysis shows that lobbying regulation has
emerged as an international standard through processes
of socialization (Crepaz, 2017). Nevertheless, in its cur-
rent stage, the adoption of lobby registers has not yet
reached the tipping point of becoming an international
norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). Once enough
countries have adopted international standards voluntar-
ily, such standards would evolve into ‘hard law,’ for exam-
ple through international treaties (Morais, 2001, p. 781)
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or acquire a taken-for-granted quality, in the sense that
domestic adherence to international norms is not dis-
puted. In this stage of international norm emergence,
the adoption of anti-corruption measures such as lobby
registers is the result of the combined effect of external
stimuli from IOs’ soft governance mechanisms and inter-
nal stimuli from domestic political actors (Borz, 2019).
In the following, we focus on internal stimuli to explain
adoption of lobby registers.
3. Under Which Conditions Does Corruption Lead to
the Adoption of Lobby Registers?
3.1. The Conditional Effect of Corruption on Lobbying
Regulation
A comparative empirical analysis of developed democ-
racies has demonstrated that there is no link between
corruption and the adoption of lobby registers (Crepaz,
2017). This result fits with the classical view that in
rich democracies corruption is not a sufficiently press-
ing problem to take action (Campos&Giovannoni, 2007),
whereas in poor countries corruption is so endemic
that collective action against corruption is impossible
(Persson et al., 2013). These results are, however, not sat-
isfactory. In some cases, corruption can contribute to the
regulation of lobbying and policymakers will not be able
to resist the public demand for enhanced accountability
and transparency. For example:
Especially among the wealthier European economies
that have been racked by government scandal and
public cynicism in recent years, there is a concerted
effort by governmental authorities to win back the
public’s confidence through renewed transparency
in the policymaking process. (Holman & Luneburg,
2012, p. 77)
Against this background, we argue that policymakers will
be particularly responsive especially to middle-class cit-
izens’ demands to reduce corruption if domestic eco-
nomic development has resulted in improved work-
ing conditions, education and public services (Biswas
& Vijaya, 2019). In these countries, governments want
to reduce corruption—at least symbolically—because a
high level of perceived corruption tends to stifle eco-
nomic growth (Mauro, 1995) and causes discontent
amongst citizens, especially in middle-income countries
and countries with a large and growing middle class
(Biswas & Vijaya, 2019). In this case, policymakers con-
sider it beneficial to regulate lobbying to signal that trad-
ing in influence will be prosecuted, and lobbying is a pos-
sible legal channel to seek political influence (Campos &
Giovannoni, 2007). This process is particularly likely to
happen in EU and OECD member states (OECD, 2009),
which have some level of corruption but strive to main-
tain their economic development and aim at being in
good standingwith the practices and emerging standards
of IOs. In such contexts, citizens and civil society orga-
nizations are likely to monitor and sanction the behav-
ior of elected officials and interest groups (Elster, 1998,
p. 1) and to promote the adoption of international norms
(Borz, 2019), as they aim at maintaining democratic stan-
dards and economic prosperity (Biswas & Vijaya, 2019).
Empirically, this mechanism implies that the interaction
between the size of the economy and the level of cor-
ruption should impact positively on the development of
the economy.
3.2. Additional Domestic Explanations
One alternative explanation for the adoption of lobby
registers is that such measures serve to level the play-
ing field for interest groups, in a context where many
large organizations dominate the interest group land-
scape (Flavin, 2015; Zeller, 1948). To control for this differ-
ent explanation, we assess whether the structure of civil
society—if civil society organizations are composed of
larger and smaller organizations—impacts on the prob-
ability to adopt lobby registers (Anheier, 2004; Bernhard,
1993). Accordingly, we expect that the presence of larger
interest organizations increases the probability of lobby
registers adoption as governments would want to make
the influence of large interest groups transparent.
Previous empirical models also show that bicameral
countries aremore likely to adopt lobby registers (Crepaz,
2017). Bicameralism is oftenmore ineffective in ensuring
accountability than unicameralism (Testa, 2010) and, con-
sequently, in bicameral countries citizens are more likely
to demand anti-corruption tools like lobby registers.
Finally, the age of the democracy could explain the
adoption of lobby registers. The older the democratic
systems, the less likely it is that policymakers will con-
sider the adoption of such a register to be necessary, as
it is likely that there are other institutional practices in
place which avoid corruption. However, another way to
look at it is that, in an established democracy, the de-
mand for transparency is going to be bigger since trans-
parency is an embedded value in that society and its abil-
ity to functions.
3.3. Economic and External Spatial Factors
In economies which rely on high level of foreign direct in-
vestments, governments aremore likely to adopt a lobby
register. If foreign investments play an important role,
governments have incentives to create lobby registers to
ensure transparency standards, which will ensure legal
certainty and a level playing field for domestic and for-
eign investors (Gilardi, 2002).
The spatial dimension is also another potential con-
founding factor that might explain why governments
adopt lobby registers. The more that territorially close
countries adopt lobby registers, the more likely a coun-
try is to imitate and adopt a lobby register (De Francesco,
2012; Trein, 2017)
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4. Data, Research Design, and Statistical Model
In the empirical analysis, we focus on the adoption of
lobby registers, rather than measuring the strictness of
existing regulations. Our approach follows Ainsworth’s
(1993) argument that disclosure of key information on
lobbyists and interest groups reduces the risk of undue
interest group influence. This choice is also justified by
the fact that lobbying regulations are afflicted with the
definitional issues and problems arising from deciding
what distinguishes lobbying from other modes of inter-
est groups representation, and what legitimates lobby-
ing activities (Greenwood & Thomas, 1998). The extent
of robustness of lobbying laws is also contested (Crepaz
& Chari, 2018). This definitional maze is even more evi-
dent in a comparative analysis, as in different countries
what constitutes legal conduct depends on cultural in-
sights. Further, as lobbying regulations are embedded in
broader national anticorruption policies (Doig & McIvor,
2003; Piccio, Di Mascio, & Natalini, 2014), the adoption
of lobbying regulations depends on the wider adminis-
trative regulatory framework that sets the standards for
good governance (OECD, 2009).
To ascertain the year when each country adopted
lobby registers, we rely on the OECD’s data (OECD, 2016).
Like Crepaz (2017), we focus on the probability of a
given country adopting a lobby register in a specific year
as the dependent variable for our analysis. However,
our research design differs in two important ways from
Crepaz’s (2017) analysis. First, rather than assessing the
adoption of registers across 34 developed countries be-
tween 1995 and 2014, we analyze the probability of
adoptionwithin an extended sample of 42 countries (the
OECD partners and member countries and the EU mem-
ber states), but for a shorter period of time as the first
year of observation is 2000, which is three years before
the start of the OECD’s engagementwith lobbying regula-
tions. This choice is justified by the fact that before 2000
both the EU and the OECD did not engage in promoting
lobby registers internationally. Second, due to the lim-
ited adoption of lobby registers, we cannot yet explore
different mechanisms of policy diffusion, such as emu-
lation, learning, and competition (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016).
Our main independent variables stem from the
V-Dem data set (Coppedge et al., 2016). To analyze our
main argument, i.e., the interaction of the size of the
economy and corruption, we use the ‘v2x_corr’ variable
for citizens’ perception of corruption. This index provides
average values of the following four sub-indexes: i) pub-
lic sector corruption index; ii) executive corruption index;
iii) the indicator for legislative corruption; and iv) the in-
dicator for judicial corruption. To operationalize the size
of the economy, we use the World Bank’s data on GDP
per capita (divided by 10,000 in order for the scale to be
convenient for our analysis).We centered the interaction
effect around the mean in order to make the interpreta-
tion of the results more straightforward (Table 1).
We also use the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al.,
2016) to operationalize some of the additional explana-
tions. Concerning the size of interest groups, we employ
the ‘v2csstruc_1’ variable from theV-Demdataset,which
measures the extent to which large civil society organiza-
tions are highly influential in policymaking. Specifically,
this variable is constructed around expert surveys that
attempt “to characterize the relative influence of large
mass constituency CSOs [civil society organizations] ver-
sus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs”
(Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 237). Varying between 0 and 1,
this variable shows the mean of the respondent fre-
quencies and the association of a given country to the
fact that large civil society organizations are influential.
Accordingly, “the voice of such organizations is recog-
nized by the government and is accorded special weight
by policymakers” (Coppedge et al., 2016, pp. 237–238).
Relying on the variables ‘v2lgbicam’ and
‘e_democracy_duration’ of the V-Dem dataset, the vari-
able ‘bicameralism’ is a binary variable that assumes
value 1 if a given country has two legislative chambers
and the variable ‘duration of democracy’ measures the
years since a given country’s transition to democracy,
i.e., a political regime that allows electoral contestation
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Adoption of lobby register 605 0.0214876 0.145123 0 1
GDP per capita (USD2010)/10,000 672 2.770338 2.202109 0.0698905 11.00011
Corruption 640 0.2467482 0.2087432 0.0093516 0.9449248
GDP per capita * Corruption 640 0.3620021 0.2911869 0.0354769 1.637297
Large civil society organizations 640 0.3704611 0.267097 0 1
Bicameralism 672 0.4761905 0.4998048 0 1
Duration of democracy 672 53.7381 42.70835 1 168
Foreign direct investment 661 8.307487 31.36755 −58.97767 451.7155
Spatial lag 630 0.0419275 0.0455238 0 0.429576
t 672 8.5 4.613206 1 16
t2/10 672 9.35 8.067177 0.1 25.6
t3/100 672 11.56 12.72727 0.01 40.96
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(“political leaders that are chosen through free and fair
elections”) and participation (“a minimal level of suf-
frage”; Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 321). For all variables
from the V-Dem data set, we lagged the observation by
three years in order to avoid an endogeneity issue. We
used two other data sources for the remaining control
variables. The measurement regarding ‘foreign direct in-
vestment’ uses data on trade volume from the World
Bank and is lagged by three years. For all variables, ex-
cept for the age of democracy, we lagged the observa-
tion by three years to control for endogeneity. Finally,
to create the spatial lag of policy adoption, we followed
common standards for the creation of spatial lags in pol-
icy diffusion analysis (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2016).
To carry out our empirical analysis, we use Event
History Analysis, an established methodology in policy
diffusion studies. Amongst the possible Event History
Analysis models, we have chosen the logit model, which
allows for flexibility in the analysis (Langner, Bender,
Lenz-Tönjes, Küchenho, & Blettner, 2003). In time-series
cross-sectional analysis, logit models, however, come
with the specification issue related to the likelihood that
the observations are temporally dependent (Buckley &
Westerland, 2004; Mooney, 2001). To consider time se-
riously (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998), we have inserted
three-time variables, ‘t,’ ‘t2/10,’ and ‘t3/100,’ in the dis-
crete Event History Analysis (Carter & Signorino, 2010).
Finally, we complement the statistical analysis with two
case studies, which provide us withmore detailed insight
on the link between anti-corruption policy agenda and
the adoption of lobby registers.
5. Statistical Results
To carry out the empirical analysis, we estimated two
models, one which examines the main argument of our
analysis, testing whether the interaction of corruption
and the size of the economy impacts on the adoption
of lobbying regulations, and another one that includes
the variables for additional explanations (Table 2). The
findings suggest that the first model, which includes only
the interaction of GDP per capita and corruption fits the
data slightly better than the model including the control
variables due to a slightly lower Bayesian Information
Criterion value.
Substantially, the results indicate that higher corrup-
tion rates augment the probability of adopting lobby reg-
isters in contexts where the economy is relatively de-
veloped. The positive interaction effect suggests that
the co-occurrence of corruption and a higher GDP per
capita make it more likely that policymakers will adopt a
lobby register. If we control for both variables separately,
there is no statistically significant effect. In Model 2 of
Table 2 we add the control variables. These results indi-
cate that a second parliamentary chamber has a statisti-
cally significant effect on the adoption of lobby registers,
while the variable ‘large civil society organizations’ is only
marginally significant. All the other control variables do
not indicate a statistically significant effect.
To better interpret the findings and to understand
their substantial robustness, we now turn to a graphical
representation of the results (Figure 2). The lower part
of Figure 2 indicates that our sample is composed of sev-
eral observations characterized by a relatively low level
of GDP per capita and high levels of corruption. Another
relatively large group of observations is characterized by
mid-level of economic development and low-level cor-
ruption. To effectively demonstrate the substantial effect
of the interaction term, we created a binary variable of
the corruption variable, which varies from zero to one at
the mean. This strategy allows us to distinguish observa-
tionswith rather low levels of corruption, represented by
Table 2. Results of the regression analysis (standard errors clustered according to countries).
Model (1) Model (2)
Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors
GDP per capita −0.490** (0.246) −1.132** (0.577)
Corruption −7.449** (3.593) −9.799** (4.123)
GDP per capita * Corruption 2.610** (1.179) 4.138*** (1.621)
Bicameralism 1.600** (0.750)
Large civil society organizations 1.817* (1.221)
Duration of democracy 0.0106 (0.0117)
Foreign direct investment −0.00259 (0.00851)
Spatial lag −8.070 (9.341)
t −0.135 (0.892) −0.776 (1.460)
t2 0.476 (1.085) 1.254 (1.732)
t3 −0.200 (0.397) −0.452 (0.614)
Constant −3.038 (2.344) −2.279 (3.861)
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.19
Observations 573 528
Akaike Information Criterion 126 126
Bayesian Information Criterion 156 178
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2. Plot of the interaction effect of GDP per capita and corruption. Source: Authors’ own illustration.
the black line in Figure 2, from those with a higher level
of corruption, which we identify by the blue line.
The upper part of Figure 2 shows that countries with
low levels of corruption and low levels of economic de-
velopment are most likely to adopt lobby registers, as
the black line in the graph is clearly above zero for obser-
vations associated with a medium-level GDP per capita.
In countries with low levels of corruption and a level of
GDP around $20,000—$40,000 per capita, policymakers
are more likely to adopt lobby registers than in coun-
tries with high corruption and low economic develop-
ment or in countries with high economic development
and low corruption.
This finding supports our main argument that under
the presence of low to moderate corruption and signif-
icant but not very high economic development, policy-
makers are likely to adopt lobby registers. Suchmeasures
signal to citizens that transparency and the reduction of
corruption are important goals. Further, these reforms in-
dicate to IOs and companies that the country abides by
emerging standards of good governance.
6. Adopting Lobby Registers in Slovenia and Italy
In this section, we complement our statistical analyses
by tracing the political and institutional process that led
Italy and Slovenia to adopt a lobby register, and we il-
lustrate how national lawmakers responded to the exter-
nal stimulus of the international anti-corruption agenda
(Borz, 2019). Both EU countries are characterized by an
overall negative public perception of lobbying, reduc-
ing the political incentive to pass lobbying regulations
(Fink-Hafner, 2017; Habič, 2014; McGrath, 2008; Petrillo,
2017; Transparency International Italia, 2014). First, we
focus on Slovenia as it is a ‘typical case’ (Gerring, 2007)
of the relationship that we demonstrate statistically; the
values for corruption and GDP per capita are below the
mean in the sample. Second, we assess Italy, which is a
‘deviant case’ (Gerring, 2007) from the above discussed
relationship as its corruption levels are clearly above
0.35 and as GDP per capita varies between $33,000
and $38,000, in the sample. Therefore, the Italian case
complements the statistical analysis as it shows how
the configuration of relatively high corruption and a de-
veloped economy increases the probability of adopting
lobby registers.
6.1. Slovenia
Slovenia adopted a lobby register in the national anti-
corruption legislation based on a government bill, after
two failed parliamentary initiatives that aimed at passing
a specific law on lobbying and public participation in law-
making process (Habič, 2014, p. 14; Kosmač, 2014). The
2010 Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act estab-
lished one of the most comprehensive sets of lobbying
regulations in Europe (Holman & Luneburg, 2012). The
lobby register was adopted in the wake of an increase in
the influence of interest groups on policymaking, which
prompted public concern about corruption. Within this
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anti-corruption framework, the register aims to tackle
the secrecy in the relationship between professional lob-
byists and public officials that is often associated with
bribery in Slovenia (Habič, 2014, p. 15). Accordingly, the
2010 Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act targets
both lobbyists and legislative and executive public offi-
cials at the national and local level (Kosmač, 2014). On
the one hand, as employees or legal representative are
excluded from the legislation, only professional lobby-
ists are required to register with the Commission for
Prevention of Corruption, the national anti-corruption
agency, and to summarize annually their activity details;
on the other hand, public officials have to check that
lobbyists contacting them are registered and report to
the Commission for Prevention of Corruption on each
meeting. The Commission for Prevention of Corruption
is in charge of enforcing the regulations and has power
to sanction non-compliance (Group of States against
Corruption, 2018; Habič, 2014; Mulcahy, 2015).
The influence of the EU and the OECD was important
for shifting lobbying regulation onto the anti-corruption
agenda after the failure of the National Assembly to
regulate lobbying (Habič, 2014, p. 14; Kosmač, 2014).
Through the 2010 Integrity and Prevention of Corruption
Act, Slovenia complied with international obligations on
preventing and combating corruption, which proves this
point. In 2002, the international anti-corruption stan-
dards facilitated the emergence of the anti-corruption
policy through the institutionalization of theOffice of the
Government for the Prevention of Corruption. Two years
later, the policy was consolidated through the adop-
tion of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which trans-
formed the Office of the Government for the Prevention
of Corruption into an independent body accountable to
the Parliament. It is important to note that the main re-
sult of the Office of the Government for the Prevention
of Corruption was the 2002 legislative draft to prevent
corruption that was the basis for the 2004 Prevention
of Corruption Act (Dobovšek & Škrbec, 2012, p. 167),
which specified compliance with anti-corruption conven-
tions and international standards (Dobovšek & Škrbec,
2012, p. 173). These legislative and institutional condi-
tions were the bedrock of a further expansion of anti-
corruption policy. Overall, the institutional alignment of
the Slovenian anti-corruption policy with international
standards facilitated the adoption of the lobby register
notwithstanding the inconsistent political support for
the policy (Dobovšek & Škrbec, 2012, p. 177).
6.2. Italy
Despite the OECD’s assessment that Italy adopted a com-
prehensive lobby register, the regulatory landscape in
the country is fragmented. Comprehensive national leg-
islation has not been adopted, despite numerous par-
liamentary and executive initiatives starting in the mid-
1970s (Chamber of Deputies, 2016). In 2012, theMinistry
of agriculture adopted a public list of lobbyists en-
gaged within agribusiness (Chamber of Deputies, 2016).
The Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Policy, and the Ministry of Environment
followed later. At the local level, six regions (Tuscany
in 2002, Molise in 2004, Abruzzo in 2010, Calabria
in 2016, Lombardy in 2016, and Apulia in 2017) also
adopted lobby registers (Carloni, 2017). By establish-
ing a consultation procedure for new regulatory propos-
als (Transparency International Italia, 2014, p. 9), the
Ministry of agriculture was the first Italian institution to
specify the rights and obligations associated with the ac-
tivities of interest groups in the policymaking process
at the national level. Further, in 2016, the Chamber of
Deputies internally regulated lobbying activities through
a register maintained by the Office of the President.
Notwithstanding the lack of national legislation on lobby-
ing, the enactment of these two registers was a sufficient
condition for being considered by the OECD as a country
that has adopted a lobby register (OECD, 2016).
The fragmentation of the Italian lobbying regulations
and anti-corruption legislation is a sort of functional
equivalent of a uniform and comprehensive lobby reg-
ister. Indeed, the adoption of lobby registers by sev-
eral different national and regional institutions has filled
the gap left by the 2012 anticorruption law that targets
civil servants rather than elected officials. Contrary to
Slovenia’s uniform and comprehensive lobbying regula-
tion, the Italian anti-corruption legislation assembles a
series of measures for enhancing administrative trans-
parency and integrity (e.g., regulation of public officials’
conflict of interests and transparency of public admin-
istration through proactive disclosure of information).
However, by combining the regulation of conflict of in-
terests and administrative transparency, the Italian anti-
corruption legislation contains several elements for ‘in-
directly’ regulating interest groups’ influence on execu-
tive and administrative policymaking (cf. Carloni, 2017).
Through a sequence of sectoral adoptions and the cumu-
lative effect of measures for tackling administrative cor-
ruption, the Italian case is a one of consolidation of lobby-
ing regulation that is often misjudged by the assessment
of the European Commission and the OECD.
The Italian approach follows an established logic
of the country’s postwar consolidation of democracy
(Morlino, 1998), according to which parties have low
incentives to regulate their interaction with civil so-
ciety and governments (Pasquino, 1989). This mecha-
nism is visible in the process of lobbying regulation.
For example, the above-mentioned lobby registers and
code of conduct were considered as necessary instru-
ments for enhancing the ‘political ethics’ by a group
of experts on institutional reforms appointed by the
President of Republic, Giorgio Napolitano (Mauro, Onida,
Quagliariello, & Violante, 2013). Further, the adoption
of the lobby register within the Ministry of Agriculture
passed under the technocratic government of Mario
Monti. In the same year, that government was crucial
for the adoption of anti-corruption law and the establish-
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ment of an anti-corruption agency, as the parliamentary
approval was obtained through a confidence vote. This
law aligned Italy with international norms on public ad-
ministrators’ transparency, integrity, and incompatibility
(Piccio et al., 2014).
The Italian resistance against comprehensive legisla-
tion on the matter is linked to the perception that lob-
bying should not be ‘legalized’ as a professional form
of interest group representation. According to this logic,
professional lobbyists (and more in general interest
groups) are detrimental to the traditional but declining
forms of representation such as political parties (Carloni,
2017; Petrillo, 2017) and corporative institutions (Pritoni,
2019). This aversion of the Italian legislators to lobbying
is also evident in its definitions that encompass any type
of interest group engaged in indirect or direct forms of
political influence. As opposed to Slovenia, where pub-
lic relations have a long tradition (Fink-Hafner, 2017),
this may be also due to the lack of recognized train-
ing and professionalization of Italian lobbyists (Petrillo,
2017). Further, the polarization of the anti-corruption
agenda has not facilitated the formation of reform coali-
tions (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2007; Di Mascio, Maggetti,
& Natalini, 2018), nor has there been a steady institution-
alization of the anti-corruption policy (Piccio et al., 2014)
as in Slovenia. The Italian lawmakers’ line of resistance
to international pressure was weakened only in occasion
of technocratic governments and the 2013 electoral suc-
cess of a new party, the Five StarMovement (Piccio et al.,
2014). These unorthodox agents of reform were able to
overcome the impossibility of forming reform coalitions
“given the greater inflexibility of the administrative bu-
reaucracies and the higher degree of conflict among the
government parties” that distinguishes the Italian politi-
cal system from other economically developed democra-
cies (Pasquino, 1989, pp. 37–38).
7. Discussion and Conclusions
This article has analyzed the adoption of lobby registers
across 42 countries. Starting with the assumption that
the OECD and the EU have been influencing the adoption
of lobby registers (Crepaz, 2017), our research question
has focused on corruption as themain rationale for coun-
tries to respond to the emergence of an international
norm characterized by an anti-corruption agenda. By re-
ducing the information asymmetry between citizens and
elected officials, registers enhance transparency in lobby-
ing activities, with the potential to reduce the likelihood
of biased and undue influence, and ultimately of corrupt
policymaking (Bolleyer, 2018).
Our statistical findings show that the interaction be-
tween the size of the economy and corruption explains
why governments adopt lobby registers. Most of the
countries that have adopted lobby registers are not char-
acterized by high levels of corruption and high levels
of economic development. Instead, among our sample
of 42 of the most developed countries, the adoption of
lobby registers is mainly associated with low to moder-
ate corruption and a significant but not very high GDP
per capita. Our explanation for this pattern is that politi-
cians have an incentive to regulate lobbying if they want
to push economic development forward and respond
to middle class demand to reduce corruption. This find-
ing fits with other research on corruption, which indi-
cates that in middle-income countries citizens are most
concerned about corruption (Biswas & Vijaya, 2019).
Specifically, the legalization of professional lobbying cre-
ates certainty for corporations and increases the attrac-
tiveness of a country for foreign investors.
The two case studies show that both in Italy and in
Slovenia lobby registers were adopted through an anti-
corruption agenda as promoted by IOs. The two coun-
tries differ in terms of underlying conditions for the adop-
tion and implementation of a lobby register. While in
Slovenia the lobby register was adopted through an in-
cremental institutionalization of international standards
policy, in Italy political resistance to the idea of recog-
nizing (professional) lobbying was removed only during
twowindows of opportunity that opened up in 2012 and
2016, resulting in a fragmented set of registers adopted
andmaintained by few national and regional institutions.
Nevertheless, their embeddedness in a multilevel con-
text (Thomann, Trein, &Maggetti, 2019; Trein, Thomann,
& Maggetti, 2019) contributed to the adoption of lobby
registers for both countries.
Although our results provide an interesting explana-
tion for the adoption of lobby registers, there are limi-
tations to our analysis. The diffusion process regarding
lobby registers is still underway; within the next 10 years
many more countries will perhaps have adopted such
registers, making them a consolidated norm, and accord-
ingly internal functional explanations might not play a
role. Conversely, governments could opt to adopt other
transparency mechanisms and anticorruption tools en-
abling control of bureaucracy rather than interest groups
and elected officials. Furthermore, lobbying regulations
were often discarded thanks to their complexity (Crepaz
& Chari, 2018) and their record of limited effectiveness
in corrupt settings (dos Santos & da Costa, 2014), leading
to citizens’ resigned acceptance rather than indignation
(Bauhr & Grimes, 2014).
However, focusing on the initial wave of adoption of
a public governance standard, this empirical analysis al-
lows us to make practical recommendations to IOs en-
gaged in the provision of international best practices for
policymaking transparency. Although IOs have correctly
associated lobby registers with the issue of corruption, it
is important to note that the promotion of this institu-
tional solution may lead to symbolic adoption. To avoid
such risk, IOs should also frame lobbying regulation as
a way to enhance the profession of public relations and
lobbyists, as the case of Slovenia attests. Amore compre-
hensive agenda framed around the conditions for ensur-
ingmore professional lobbying could transform the nega-
tive public perception of lobbying as a tool for channeling
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interest group positions, and, ultimately, achieving policy
responsiveness to the general public.
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